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Abstrat
A very useful tehnique a network administrator an use to identify
problemati network behavior is areful analysis of logs of inoming and
outgoing network ows. The hallenge one faes when attempting to
undertake this ourse of ation, though, is that large networks tend to
generate an extremely large quantity of network tra in a very short
period of time, resulting in very large tra logs whih must be analyzed
post-generation with an eye for ontextual information whih may reveal
symptoms of problemati tra
1
. A better tehnique is to perform real-
time log analysis using a real-time ontext-generating tool suh as LoGS.
1 Introdution
One of the simplest and most omprehensive intrusion detetion methods avail-
able to a network administrator is analysis of rewall or network manager (suh
as Ciso's NetFlow) logs[Ranum04℄. Even logs ontaining very basi informa-
tion, suh as destination and soure IP address-port pairs an under proper
srutiny reveal important information about attempted attaks on the system
and internal problems. Firewall or another entral point for network tra is
an ideal spot for olleting this information, sine
• All network tra passes through it.
• Most rewalls generate exellent ativity logs[Cid04℄.
The usefulness of this tehnique is diminished by the fat that on large net-
works, any interesting messages will be interspersed among a large number of
non-maliious tra. Combined with the fat that large networks send and re-
eive on millions of onnetions per seond, doing intrusion detetion beomes a
problem of nding a needle in a hay stak. For example, onsider the following
tional log entries:
1
Suh as non-obvious port sans and tra indiative of worm ativity
1
Nov 5 14:03:33,*.*.*.10:3434,1.2.3.5:12346
Nov 5 14:15:13,*.*.*.10:3434,1.2.3.6:12346
Nov 5 14:28:32,*.*.*.10:3434,1.2.3.7:12346
Nov 5 14:40:11,*.*.*.10:3434,1.2.3.8:12346
This example shows a host on address *.*.*.10 sanning our network for open
NetBus ports[ISS98℄. However, sine this is a very slow san (individual on-
netions are approximately 12 minutes apart), there may be several million
non-informative log entries separating these interesting entries. Depending on
the way the log is audited by the administrator, it is possible for this trend to
be missed. Instead of analyzing large network logs in searh of tell-tale signs
of attempted (or suessful) intrusion, the network administrator may opt for
using a real-time log analysis tool to analyze log messages as they are generated
and detet problems based on ontext reated by previously seen messages.
2 The Problem
For this ase study, anonymized NetFlow log generated by onnetions to and
from the network of a large university was examined. The log is over 1 GB in
size. Chronologially, it spans a little over one hour. It ontains 13.6 million
individual entries. Currently, these logs are olleted, but not analyzed, despite
ontaining a wealth of information. It is possible to write a rudimentary sript
whih will proess suh logs post-reation and searh for interesting information.
In adopting this strategy a number of questions must be onsidered.
1. How do I subdivide the log into separate les?
2. How do I ollet and store ontextual information that will help me detet
port sans?
3. Can I handle potential ontext overow from one log to the next?
4. Do I proess eah log le after its reated, or do I ollet some number of
log les and proess them as a bath?
Appendix 1 shows a sample sript to proess suh logs. While it is fairly onise,
it does a poor job of addressing ontextual issues. Speially, it only stores
state for the last onnetion, whih makes it impossible for this sript to detet
any port sans where the onnetions are not immediately subsequent. While
it is possible to inrease the depth of stored ontext, doing so would neessi-
tate reating a store-and-searh infrastruture for ontext, whih, when done
improperly an greatly redue the performane of the sript. Additionally, this
sript does not address the problem of ontext overowing from one log le to
another. These questions an be bypassed altogether, on the other hand, by
real-time sanning with LoGS.
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3 LoGS
LoGS, urrently under development by James Prewett at the Center for High
Performane Computing at University of New Mexio is a highly ustomizable
and extensible real-time log analysis engine written in Common Lisp. It is quite
eient, able to proess as many as 72,000 messages per seond [Pre05℄. Beause
it uses Common Lisp in its rule denition, it an be programmed to reate and
store states and run omplex sripts whenever a message is mathed [Pre04℄.
The use of Common Lisp makes LoGS unique from other log analysis tools.
Common Lisp was hosen for its exibility, availability and ease of use. Lisp also
has a fast regular expression engine[Wei03℄, whih allows LoGS to ahieve its
high message proessing speed. Also, sine Common Lisp is used to ongure
the rulesets as well, LoGS is user-extendable.
LoGS onsists of ve omponents - Messages, Rules, Rulesets, Ations and
Contexts. Rules assoiate Messages (input from the analyzed log) with Ations
(Lisp or external sripts). Rulesets extend Rules by grouping them together
into related sets. Contexts ollet related messages together to be proessed as
a group. Beause LoGS ations an reate new rules, as well as update existing
rules, LoGS is run-time ongurable. [Pre04℄
4 Analyzing Firewall logs with LoGS
The ontext-oriented design of LoGS ts perfetly for the goal of real-time re-
wall log analysis. Firewall logs dier from, for example, system logs in that you
annot implement artiial ignorane[Ranum04℄, as every message may poten-
tially ontain interesting information when taken in a ontext of other messages.
Every inoming onnetion must be examined against existing ontents, and ei-
ther update them if neessary or reate new ones.
4.1 Rules
To eetively detet suspiious behavior in onnetion logs, LoGS must be on-
gured to math every inoming message, isolating three ruial piees of in-
formation - loal address, remote address, and loal port. The loal port is
then heked against a list of vulnerable ports to identify a possible vulnera-
bility san. Next, the remote address, loal address and loal port are heked
against the existing ontexts for mathes on remote address and loal address
(indiating a potential vertial port san) or remote address and loal port (in-
diating a potential horizontal port san)[Lis℄. If an existing ontext is found,
the message is added to that ontext. Otherwise a new ontext is reated for
the new message.
4.2 Contexts
Eah log entry is entered into a ontext, either a pre-existing one, or a new
one, depending on whether a similar message has been previously seen. Eah
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ontext that exists has a timeout, whih is inremented eah time a new message
is added to the ontext. When ontext timeout ours, a ontext ation is
triggered and the ontext is removed from the system. By inreasing the size of
the timeout value, the administrator an detet slower port sans (at the prie
of performane).
4.3 Ations
When a ontext times out and ertain onditions are met (for example, number
of aumulated messages in the ontext. It should be at least two or more), an
ation will be triggered. Sine LoGS allows to dene ations with arbitrary Lisp
programs and even external sripts, its possible for ontexts to trigger very om-
plex series of ations. At the very least, all the messages in the ontext should
be written to a separate port sans le. A real-time alert should also be dis-
played to the onsole whenever there is an open ontext whih has aumulated
two or more messages.
4.4 Dening real-time log analyzer in LoGS
Using the mentioned elements of LoGS it is fairly easy to onstrut a small
ruleset to do detailed real-time log analysis. The following ode is a sample of
the LoGS ode used to aomplish suh a task, written in Common Lisp.
;Firewall analysis ruleset to spot vertial
;and horizontal port san
(make-instane
'rule
:math
(lambda (message)
(multiple-value-bind (mathes sub-mathes)
(l-ppre::san-to-strings
("([0-9℄+),([0-9℄+),([0-9℄+:[0-9℄+:[0-9℄+),
(TCP|UDP|ICMP),([0-9℄+.[0-9℄+.[0-9℄+.[0-9℄+):([0-9℄+|--),
([0-9℄+.[0-9℄+.[0-9℄+.[0-9℄+):([0-9℄+|--),
[0-9℄+,([0-9℄+)"
(message message)))
(when mathes
(values
t
`((sub-mathes ,sub-mathes))))))
:ations
(
(make-instane 'rule
:math
(lambda (message)
(multiple-value-bind (mathes sub-mathes)
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(l-ppre::san-to-strings
"([0-9℄+),([0-9℄+),
([0-9℄+:[0-9℄+:[0-9℄+),
(TCP|UDP|ICMP),
(aref sub-mathes 4):([0-9℄+|--),
(aref sub-mathes 6):([0-9℄+|--),
[0-9℄+,([0-9℄+)"
(message message))
(when mathes
(values
T
`((soureip ,(aref sub-mathes 4))
(soureport,(aref sub-mathes 5))
(destip, (aref sub-mathes 6))
(destport, (aref sub-mathes 7)
(time, (aref sub-mathes 2))
)))))
:ations
(list
(lambda (message)
(delare (ignore message))
(ensure-ontext
:name (format () "vertial san from ~A" soureip)
:timeout (+ get_universal_time timeout_value)
:ations
(list
(lambda (message)
(add-to-ontext
(format () "Vertial san: ~A:~A to ~A:~A at ~A"
soureip soureport destip destport time)
message))))
)
(make-instane 'rule
:math
(lambda (message)
(multiple-value-bind (mathes sub-mathes)
(l-ppre::san-to-strings
"([0-9℄+),([0-9℄+),
([0-9℄+:[0-9℄+:[0-9℄+),
(TCP|UDP|ICMP),
(aref sub-mathes 4):([0-9℄+|--),
([0-9℄+.[0-9℄+.[0-9℄+.[0-9℄+):
(aref sub-mathes 7),
[0-9℄+,([0-9℄+)"
(message message))
(when mathes
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(values
T
`((soureip ,(aref sub-mathes 4))
(soureport,(aref sub-mathes 5))
(destip, (aref sub-mathes 6))
(destport, (aref sub-mathes 7)
(time, (aref sub-mathes 2))
)))))
:ations
(list
(lambda (message)
(delare (ignore message))
(ensure-ontext
:name (format () "horizontal san from ~A" soureip)
:timeout (+ get_universal_time timeout_value)
:ations
(list
(lambda (ontext)
(if (>= (get_universal_time) (timeout ontext))
(report_ontext)
)
(lambda (message)
(add-to-ontext
(format () "Horizontal san: ~A:~A to ~A:~A at ~A"
soureip soureport destip destport time)
message))))
)
)
5 Conlusions
Real time rewall log analysis in LoGS oers a exible and extensible alternative
to bath oine analysis. Its apability for ontextual message parsing is ideally
suited for the task of deteting port sans, as these annot be deteted from any
single onnetion and an only be inferred by looking at the ontext of previous
onnetions. LoGS provides the infrastruture for ontextual data olletion,
and the apability to trigger arbitrarily sophistiated response. This makes log
analysis a very powerful tool for suessful (and potentially real-time) intrusion
detetion.
6 Appendix 1 - Sample Perl ode
#!/usr/bin/perl
print "Input? ";
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$infile = <STDIN>;
open(INPUT,$infile)||die "Could not open $infile\n";
print "Outgoing onnetions? ";
$outgoingfile = <STDIN>;
print "Inoming onnetions? ";
$inomingfile = <STDIN>;
print "File date (yyyy/mm/dd)? ";
$date = <STDIN>;
print "Vulnerabilities file? ";
$vulfile = <STDIN>;
hop($date);
$portsans = 0;
$ongoingps = 0;
open(VULNERABILITIES, "$vulfile")
||die "Could not open $vulfile\n";
open(OUTGOING,">$outgoingfile")
||die "Could not open $outgoingfile\n";
open(INCOMING,">$inomingfile")
||die "Could not open $inomingfile\n";
open(PORTSCANS,">portsans_$infile")
||die "Could not reate portsans file\n";
open(VULSCANS,">vulsans_$infile")
||die "Could not reate vulnerabilities san file\n";
while(<VULNERABILITIES>) {
m/^([a-zA-Z0-9 ℄+),([0-9℄+),(in|out)$/;
if ($3 == 'in'){
$invul{$2} = $1 ;
}
else{
$outvul{$2} = $1 ;
}
}
$ounter = 0;
$soureip = "";
$soureport = "";
$destip = "";
$destport = "";
$time = "";
while(<INPUT>) {
/([0-9℄+),([0-9℄+),([0-9℄+:[0-9℄+:[0-9℄+),
(TCP|UDP|ICMP),([0-9℄+.[0-9℄+.[0-9℄+.[0-9℄+)
:([0-9℄+|--),([0-9℄+.[0-9℄+.[0-9℄+.[0-9℄+)
:([0-9℄+|--),[0-9℄+,([0-9℄+)/;
$lastsoureip = $soureip;
$lastsoureport = $soureport;
$lastdestip = $destip;
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$lastdestport = $destport ;
$lasttime = $time ;
$time = $3;
$protool = $4;
$soureip = $5;
$soureport = $6;
$destip = $7;
$destport = $8;
$pakets = $9 ;
if ($destport == "--")
{$destport = "0";}
if ($soureport == "--")
{$soureport = "0";}
if ($soureip =~ /10.[0-9℄+.[0-9℄+.[0-9℄+/){
print OUTGOING "FWOUT,$date,$time -5:00
GMT,$soureip:$soureport,$destip:
$destport,$protool\n";
if (exists($outvul{$soureport})){
print VULSCANS "Potential Vulnerability:
$outvul{$soureport}.\n $time:
$soureip:$soureport -> $destip:
$destport\n" ;
}
}
else{
print INCOMING "FWIN,$date,$time -5:00
GMT,$soureip:$soureport,$destip:
$destport,$protool\n";
if ($soureip == $lastsoureip &&
(($destip == $lastdestip &&
$destport != $lastdestport)||
($destport == $lastdestport &&
$destip != $lastdestip))) {
if (exists($invul{$destport})){
print VULSCANS "Potential Vulnerability:
$invul{$destport}.\n $time:
$soureip:$soureport -> $destip:
$destport\n" ;
}
if ($ongoingps == 0){
$ongoingps = 1;
$portsans = $portsans + 1;
if ($destip == $lastdestip){
print PORTSCANS "Potential vertial portsan from
$lastsoureip at $lasttime\n";
}
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else {
print PORTSCANS "Potential horizontal portsan from
$lastsoureip at $lasttime\n";
}
print PORTSCANS "$lastsoureip:$lastsoureport ->
$lastdestip:$lastdestport\n";
print PORTSCANS "$soureip:$soureport ->
$destip:$destport\n";
}
else {
print PORTSCANS "$soureip:$soureport ->
$destip:$destport\n";
}
}else {
$ongoingps = 0;
}
}
$ounter = $ounter + 1 ;
if(($ounter % 10000) == 0)
{
print "$ounter\n";
}
}
print "$portsans Portsans deteted
and written to portsans_$infile\n";
lose (INPUT);
lose (OUTGOING);
lose (INCOMING);
lose (VULSCANS);
lose (PORTSCANS);
lose (VULNERABILITIES);
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